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PUNITIVE DAMAGES UNDER SECTION 102
OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING
AND DISCLOSURE ACT

Title I of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
of 1959 (LMRDA) 1 secures to members of labor unions certain
fundamental rights. 2 Section 609 3 of the LMRDA makes it unlawful
for a union to discipline its members for exercising rights guaranteed by any provision of the Act. In ord~r to vindicate the rights
secured by Title I, or to obtain the protection afforded by section
609, a union member may, pursuant to section 102 4 of the
LMRDA, bring an action in federal district court against his union
or its officers.
It is firmly established that in a suit brought under section 102, a
union member may ordinarily recover compensatory damages for
any injury proximately caused by a violation of Title I or section
609. 5 The courts are divided, 6 however, on the question of whether
a plaintiff may be awarded punitive damages 7 under section 102.
This article will address that question by discussing the language
and the legislative history of section 102, the conflicting decisions
of the federal courts, and the relevant policy considerations.

29 U .s.c. §§ 40)-53) (1970).
Subsections IOl(a)(l)-(5) of the LMRDA provide that union members shall have equal
rights and privileges, freedom of speech and assembly, freedom from arbitrary increases in
dues and assessments, freedom to sue, and certain procedural safeguards against discipline
by their unions. 29 U.S.C. § 41 l(a)(l)-(5) (1970).
3 29 U .s.c. § 529 (1970).
4
29 u.s.c. § 412 (1970).
5
See Simmons v. Avisco, Local 713, Textile Workers, 350 F.2d 1012, 1018-19 (4th Cir.
1965); McCraw v. Plumbers, 341 F.2d 705, 710 (6th Cir. 1965); Vars v. International Bhd. of
Boilermakers, 215 F. Supp. 943, 952 (D. Conn. 1963), aff'd on other grounds, 320 F.2d 576
(2d Cir. 1963). Damages may be awarded, for example, to compensate a plaintiff for wages
lost as a result of his wrongful expulsion from the union, for strike benefits not received
during an unlawful suspension, or for medical expenses incurred on account of a physical
injury caused by a violation of the plaintiff's rights. See McCraw v. Plumbers, 341 F.2d 705,
710 (6th Cir. 1965) (by implication); Vars v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 215 F.
Supp. 943, 952 (D. Conn. 1963) (by implication), ajf'd on other grounds, 320 F.2d 576 (2d
Cir. 1963). Some courts have held, however, that damages for mental suffering are not·
recoverable under§ 102 in the absence of a concomitant physical injury. See note 59 infra.
6
See notes 29-31 and accompanying text infra.
7
Punitive damages are an element of recovery over and above full compensation of the
plaintiff for any injury he has sustained. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 908(1) (Tent.
Draft No. 19, 1973) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS]; w. PROSSER,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9 (4th ed. 197q [hereinafter cited as W. PROSSER]. They
commonly are awarded in tort actions where the defendant has acted with malice, an evil or
.outrageous motive, or a conscious disregard of the rights and interests of others. RESTATEI
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I.

STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
l

Section 102 provides that a union member may bring suit for
"such relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate. " 8 This
provision was introduced as an amendment on the floor of the
Senate, 9 and as part of a substitute bill on the floor of the House of
Representatives. 10 Like many other sections of the LMRDA which
were written on the floor of Congress, section 102 is ambiguous .11
Both its language and its legislative history are inconclusive on the
issue of whether a plaintiff may be awarded punitive damages.
Several arguments have been advanced that the language of
section 102 rules out the availability of exemplary damages. The
absence of an express provision for punitive damages may indicate
a congressional intent that they not be recoverable under section
102. 12 Furthermore, because punitive damages are more in the
nature of punishment and restraint than of relief, the use of the
word "relief' in section 102 might indicate that these damages may
not be awarded. 13 Finally, the insertion into section 102 of the
parenthetical phrase, "including injunctions," may have been intended to limit plaintiffs solely to equitable remedies. 14
None of these arguments, however, is. conclusive. Since section
102 is a catchall provision which does· hot purport to list exhaustively appropriate forms of relief, the absence of an explicit authorization of punitive damages is not necessarily probative of
congressional intent. 15 Neither should much reliance be placed

MENT (SECOND) OF TOR.TS§ 908(2); C. McC:oRM°iCK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES
§ 79, at 280 (1935) [hereinafter cited as C. McCoRMICK]; W. PROSSER,§ 2, at 9-10; see, e.g.,
Fittipaldi v. Legassie, 18 A.D.2d 331, 239N.Y.S.2d 792 (1%3) (common law action by union
members against union).
8
29 u.s.c. § 412 (1970).
9
105 CONG. REc. 6694 (1959), reprinted in II NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT, 1959, at 1221 (1959) [hereinafter
cited as LEG. His. LMRDA].
10
105 CONG. REC. 14345 (1959), reprinted in II LEG. H1s. LMRDA, supra note 9, at 1520.
11
See Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58
MICH. L. REv. 819, 852 (1960).
12
Burris v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 224 F. Supp. 277, 280-81 (W.D.N.C. 1%3);
see also McCraw v. Plumbers, 341 F.2d 705, 710 (6th Cir. 1965) (The absence of a provision
for attorney's fees indicates that such fees may not be awarded under § ·102.).
13
Cole v. Hall, 35 F.R.D. 4, 8 (E.D.N.Y. 1964); see also International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Rafferty, 348 F.2d 307, 315 (9th Cir. 1%5) ("Relief" may be an inappropriate word to
describe money damages of any kind.).
14
This argument was made by the defendants in Simmons v. Avisco, Local 713, Textile
Workers, 350 F.2d 1012, 1019 (4th Cir. 1965), and Farowitz v. Associated Musicians Local
802, 241 F. Supp. 895,909 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). In both cases the argument was rejected by the
courts.
15
See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. I, 10 (1973) (Section 102 does not "meticulously detail".
forms of relief, so attorney's fees may be recovered despite the absence of an express·
provision.).
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upon the technical meaning of the word "relief," since it is commonly used in a comprehensive manner. 16 Finally, it does not
appear that the cause of action created by section 102 is exclusively
equitable. 17 Indeed, the phrase, "including injunctions," was probably added in order to broaden the relief available under section
102, not to narrow it. 18
The legislative history of the LMRDA is silent on the specific
question of whether punitive damages may be awarded under section 102. 19 It has been argued that the absence of any consideration
of this issue indicates a congressional intent that exemplary damages should not be recoverable. 20 The lack of any directly relevant
legislative history, however, may indicate an assumption on the
part of Congress that punitive damages would be awarded in appropriate cases.
The legislative history of the LMRDA does contain statements
by members of Congress concerning the avaiiability under section
102 of monetary damages in general. Senator Goldwater declared
that section 102 would not provide sufficient incentive for union
members to sue, because the availability of damages was extremely limited. 21 Representative Elliott stated, however, that the
federal courts would have "wide latitude to grant relief according
to the necessities of the case." 22 Since Representative Elliott was a
sponsor of section 102, 23 his statement is entitled to greater weight
than. Senator Goldwater's comment. 24 Both statements are incon16 See International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Braswell, 388 F.2d 193, 200 (5th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 391 U.S. 935 (1968).
17 Simmons v. Avisco, Local 713, Textile Workers, 350 F.2d 1012, 1019 (4th Cir. 1965);
Farowitz v. Associated Musicians Local 802, 241 F. Supp. 895, 909 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
18 Gartner v. Soloner, 384 F.2d 348, 354 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1040 (1968);
Simmons v. Avisco, Local 713, Textile Workers, 350 F.2d 1012, 1019 (4th Cir. 1965). The
parenthetical phrase may have been designed to negative any inference that injunctive relief
should not be available under § 102; this inference might have been drawn from the
Norris-La Guardia Act, 29 U .S.C. §§ IOI-I 15 (1970), which provides that no federal court
may issue an injunction in a case involving a labor dispute, except as specifically permitted
by that Act.
•• International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Braswell, 388 F.2d 193, 200 (5th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 391 U.S. 935 (1968).
20
See Burris v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 224 F. Supp. 227,280 (W.D.N.C. 1963).
21 105 CONG. REC. 10095 (1959), reprinted in II LEG. His. LMRDA, supra note 9, at 1281.
Senator Goldwater stated that § 102 would offer the successful plaintiff "little in the way of
monetary damages except in the rare case where the plaintiff's job rights or job tenure have
been adversely affected." Id. But see 105 Corm. REc. 15689 (1959), reprinted in II LEG. Hts.
LMRDA, supra note 9, at 1632 (Rep. O'Hara) (Monetary damages would be widely avail,
able under § 102.).
22 105 CONG. REC. 15548 (1959), reprinted in II LEG. Hts. LMRDA, supra note 9, at 1584.
See also Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. I, 13 (1973); Gartner v. Soloner, 384 F.2d 348,353, 354(3d
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1040 (1968).
23 Representative Elliott introduced H.R. 8342, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), reprinted in I
LEG. Hts. LMRDA, supra note 9, at 687-758, which contained the original version of§ 102.
105 CONG. REC. 14177 (1959), reprinted in II LEG. Hts. LMRDA, supra note 9, at 1517.
24
In construing a statute, primary attention should be given to the views expressed by its
legislative sponsors. Gartner v. Soloner, 384 F.2d 348, 353 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
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elusive, however, since they do not deal directly with the question
of punitive damages.
Also inconclusive is the presence in the LMRDA of section
103, 25 which preserves the rights and remedies of union members
under state law. Since state courts have commonly sustained the
availability of punitive damages in member-union litigation, 26 it can
be argued that Congress impliedly placed its imprimatur on punitive damages when it enacted section 103. 27 Congress may have
decided, however, that exemplary damages were unnecessary
under section 102, because they are available under state law. 28
II.

THE CASE LAW

The three circuit courts which have considered the issue have
held that punitive damages may be awarded under section 102. 29
Although the district courts have been divided on this question, 30

U.S. 1040 (1968). See also Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. I, li-12 (1973), where the Supreme Court
explicitly repudiated Senator Goldwater's accompanying statement that attorney's fees
would not be available under§ 102, 105 CONG. REc. 10095 (1959), reprinted in II LEG. Hts.
LMRDA, supra note 9, at 1281.
25
29 u.s.c. § 413 (1970).
26
Brandwen, Punitive-Exemplary Damages in Labor Relations Litigation, 29 U. CHI. L.
REv. 460(1962);see, e.g., Fittipaldi v. Legassie, 18A.D.2d 331, 239N.Y.S.2d 792 (1963).
27
Moreover, it would be desirable to coordinate the LMRDA with state law, so as to
avoid a clash of remedies. Summers, Pre-emption and the Labor Reform Act-Dual Rights
and Remedies, 22 OHIO STATE L.J. 119, 122-23, 145 (1961).
28
Since§ 103 was designed to avoid federal preemption of state rights and remedies, state
law may in some ways provide greater protection to union members than the LMRDA. /d.,
at 124-25; see also Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do In Fact, 70
YALE L.J. 175, 176 (1960).
29
Morrissey v. National Maritime Union, 544 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1976); Cooke v. Orange
Belt Dist. Council of Painters No. 48, 529 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1976); International Bhd. of
Boilermakers v. Braswell, 388 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 935 (1968).
30
The following cases have held that punitive damages are available under§ 102: Berg v.
Watson, 417 F. Supp. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Woods v. Local 613, lnt'I Bhd. of Elec.
Worlcers, 404 F. Supp. 110 (N .D. Ga. 1975); Sipe v. Local 191, United Bhd. of Carpenters,
393 F. Supp. 865 (M.D. P-a. 1975); Yablonski v. United Mine Worlcers, 80 L.R.R.M. 3435,
(D.D.C. 1972); Robins v. Schonfeld, 326 F. Supp. 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Cole v. Hall, 80
L.R.R.M. 2267 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), ajf'd on other grounds, 462 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1972), ajf'd,
412 U.S. 1 (1973) (rejecting a prior preliminary holding in the same case, reported in 35
F.R.D. 4 (E.D.N.Y. 1964), that punitive damages may not be awarded under§ 102); Patrick
v. I.D. Packing Co., 308 F. Supp. 821 (S.D. Iowa 1969); Sands v. Abelli, 290 F. Supp. 677
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); Barbourv. Sheet Metal Worlcers Int'I Ass'n, 263 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Mich.
1966), rev' don other grounds, 401 F.2d 152 (6th Cir. 1968); Farowitz v. Associated Musicians Local 802, 241 F. Supp. 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
The following cases have held that exemplary damages may not be awarded under§ 102:
Magelssen v. Local 518, Operative Plasterers, 240 F. Supp. 259 (W.D. Mo. 1965) (alternative holding); Keenan v. District Council, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 59 L.R.R.M. 2510
(E.D. P-a. 1965); Burris v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 224 F. Supp. 277 (W.D.N.C.
1963).
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the trend is clearly in favor of allowing the recovery of exemplary
damages. 31
The conflicting decisions cannot be reconciled on the basis of
any relevant factor. The recoverability of punitive damages under
section 102 has been unaffected by the provision of Title I under
which the cause of action arose. 32 Moreover, the decisions have
not been influenced by whether the alleged violation of Title I was
committed by an individual union officer, a union disciplinary
tribunal, or a vote of the union membership. 33 Neither have the
courts used the recoverability of punitive damages and the availability of either attorney's fees 34 or compensatory damages for
mental suffering 35 as substitutes for each other.
31
A clear majority of the decisions, including every decison since ·1965, have held that
punitive damages are allowable under § 102. See notes 29-30 supra.
32 The decisions holding that punitive damages may not be awarded under § 102 involved
alleged violations of§ lOl(a)(I), (2), or (5) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 41 l(a)(I), (2), (5)
(1970). For a description of these provisions. see note 2 supra. Magelssen v. Local 518,
Operative Plasterers, 240 F. Supp. 259 (W.D. Mo. 1965) (§ 101(a)(5)); Keenan v. District
Council, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 59 L.R:R.M. 2510 (E.D. Pa. 1965) (§ IOl(a)(2), (5));
Burris v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 224 F. Supp. 277 (W.D.N.C. 1963) (§ IOl(a)(I),

(2), (5)).

Many of the cases holding that exemplary damages are allowable involved the same
provisions. Morrissey v. National Maritime Union, 544 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1976) (§ I0l(a)(2));
International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Braswell, 388 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
391 U.S. 935 (1968) (§ J0l(a)(5)); Berg v. Watson, 417 F. Supp. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (§ IOI
(a)(5)); Woods v. Local 613, Int'I Bhd. ofElec. Workers, 404 F. Supp. I IO (N.D. Ga. 1975)
(§ IOl(a)(I)); Barbour v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'! Ass'n, 263 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Mich.
1966), rev'd on other grounds, 401 F. 2d 152 (6th Cir. 1968) (§ IOl(a)(2), (5)); Farowitz v.
Associated Musicians Local 802, 241 F. Supp. 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (§ IOl(a)(2)).
33
The cases holding that punitive damages are unavailable under § 102 concerned an
alleged violation of Title I by individual union officers, Burris v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 224 F. Supp. 277 (W.D.N.C. 1963); by a trial committee of the union's district
council, Keenan v. District Council, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 59 L.R.R.M. 2510 (E.D.
Pa. 1965); and by a vote of the entire local membership, Magelssen v. Local 518, Operative
Plasterers, 240 F. Supp. 259 (W.D. Mo. 1965).
Title I violations at all three of these organizational levels may also be found among the
cases sustaining the recoverability of exemplary damages. Cooke v. Orange Belt Dist.
Council of Painters No. 48, 529 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1976) (district council); International Bhd.
of Boilermakers v. Braswell, 388 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 935 (1968)
(vote of membership); Berg v. Watson, 417 F. Supp. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (individual
officers); Yablonski v. United Mine Workers, 80 L.R.R.M. 3435 (D.D.C 1972) (individual
officer); Cole v. Hall, 80 L.R.R.M. 2267 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), affd on other grounds, 462 F.2d
777 (2d Cir. 1972), affd, 412 U.S. I (1973) (vote of membership); Barbour v. Sheet Metal
Workers lnt'l Ass'n, 263 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Mich. 1966), rev' don other grounds, 401 F.2d
152 (6th Cir. 1968) (international association trial committee).
34
Two decisions have held that awards of both punitive damages and counsel fees may be
made under§ 102. Berg v. Watson, 417 F. Supp. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Sands v. Abelli, 290
F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Conversely, in Magelssen v. Local 518, Operative Plasterers,
240 F. Supp. 259 (W.D. Mo. 1965), the court held that neither remedy may be given.
Moreover, if punitive damages were being used in place of attorney's fees, then one would
expect the trend in favor of the recoverability of exemplary damages to have been halted by
the Supreme Court's holding in Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. I (1973), that counsel fees may be
awarded to a successful plaintiff under § 102. Since Hall was decided in 1973, however,
numerous decisions have held that punitive damages are available under§ 102, while no case
has held to the contrary. See notes 29-3 I and accompanying text supra.
35
In Cooke v. Orange Belt Dist. Council of Painters No. 48, 529 F. 2d 815, 820 (9th Cir.
1976), the Ninth Circuit referred to its !)rior holding in _International Bhd. of Boilermakers v.
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Finally, decisions sustaining the recoverability of punitive damages under section 102 have not always involved more outrageous
behavior by the defendant than cases to the contrary. Thus, in
Burris v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 36 the plaintiffs
alleged that they were induced to withdraw from the union by
misrepresentations of union officers, and were subsequently
blacklisted, because they had accused the officers of failing to
bring timely unfair labor practice charges against their employer.
Despite the outrageous nature of the alleged Title I violation, the
court held that punitive damages may not be awarded under section 102. 37
In contrast, the outrageousness of the defendant's conduct is
much less striking in two cases where the plaintiffs were awarded
exemplary damages. During a dispute about the union business
manager's allegedly discriminatory assignment of jobs, the plaintiff
in International Brotherhood of Boilermakers v. Braswell 38 struck
the business manager in the face. A union trial committee convicted the plaintiff, inter alia, of violating a provision of the union
constitution, which prohibited a member from using force with the
purpose of preventing a union officer from discharging his duties.
This conviction was ratified by a vote of the membership, whereupon the plaintiff was expelled from the union. The court found
that, when he struck the business manager, the plaintiff did not
intend to prevent the officer from discharging his duties, and thus
held that the plaintiff's conduct was not proscribed by the union
constitution. The court further held that the union was not entitled
to discipline a member for conduct not expressly forbidden by its
constitution or bylaws. 39 Although the plaintiff was awarded punitive damages, the union's action was not an obvious violation of his
rights. Indeed, the Supreme Court subsequently held that unions
may discipline their members for implied offenses, and that federal
courts have no authority to interpret union regulations in order to
determine the scope of offenses for which members may be

Rafferty, 348 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1965), that damages for emotional distress may not be
recovered under§ 102 absent an accompanying physical injury, and proceeded to hold that
punitive damages are allowable. Two courts have held, however, that both exemplary and
mental suffering damages are available under§ 102. Yablonski v. United Mine Workers, 80
L.R.R.M. 3435 (D.D.C. 1972); Sands v. Abelli, 290 F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Conversely, one court, in separate proceedings of the same case, held that neither type of
damages may be awarded under§ 102. Keenan v. District Council, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 266 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (damages for mental suffering); 59 L.R.R.M. 2510
(E.D. Pa. 1965) (punitive damages).
36
224 F. Supp. 277 (W.D.N.C. 1963).
37
Id. at 280-81.
38
388 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 935 (1968).
39
Id. at 198-99.
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punished. 4 ° Consequently, today the union's action would be held
not to violate Title I at all.
Similarly, in Farowitz v. Associated Musicians Local 802, 41 the
plaintiff was expelled from his union for advocating the nonpayment of union dues. Finding that the plaintiff's advocacy of nonpayment was based upon a good faith belief that the dues were
illegally imposed, the court held that his expulsion violated the free
speech provision of section 10l(a)(2). 42 Although the plaintiff's
activities posed a threat to the financial survival of the union, the
court found that the conduct of the officers responsible for the
plaintiff's expulsion was sufficiently outrageous to justify an award
of punitive damages. 43
In both Robins v. Schonfeld 44 and Cole v. Hall, 45 it was held that
although punitive damages are available under section 102, the
plaintiffs were not entitled to recover these damages on the facts of
the cases. Yet each case involved considerably more outrageous
conduct by the defendant than either Braswell or Farowitz, in
which exemplary damages were awarded. In Robins, the plaintiff
was officially suspended from union activities and unofficially
blacklisted, because he criticized the procedures used in two union
elections in which he had been an unsuccessful candidate. The
union lifted his suspension after two weeks pending the outcome of
the litigation, but its blacklisting of the plaintiff remained in effect
for three years. Nevertheless, the court refused to grant the plaintiff punitive damages. 46 Similary, in Cole, the plaintiff was expelled
for introducing at a union meeting a series of resolutions which
were critical of the union's policies on hiring and working conditions. Although the plaintiff and the defendant union officer had
previously run against each other in a bitterly contested union
election, the court found that the plaintiff was expelled in good
faith, and thus was not entitled to punitive· damages. 47
In accordance with the practice at common law, 48 all of the
decisions sustaining the availability of punitive damages under

40
International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Hardeman, 401 U.S. 233 (1971). See Beaird &
Player, Union Discipline of Its Membership Under Section JOJ(a)(5) of Landrum-Griffin:
What Is "Discipline" and How Much Process is Due?, 9 GA. L. REv. 383, 400-01 (1975).
41
241 F. Supp. 895 (S.D.N. Y. 1965).
.
42
29 U.S.C. § 41 l(a)(2) (1970).
43
241 F. Supp. at 909.
44
326 F. Supp. 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
45
80 L.R.R.M. 2267 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), affd on other grounds, 462 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1972),
affd, 412 U.S. I (1973).
46
Robins v. Schonfeld, 326 F. Supp. 525, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
47
Cole v. Hall, 80 L.R.R.M. 2267, 2271 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), affd on other grounds, 462
F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1972), affd, 412 U.S. I (1973).
48
See note 7 supra.
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section 102 have held that these damages may be awarded only
where the defeno;mt has acted with malice or with a reckless
indifference to the plaintiff's rights. 49 This standard, however, has
been extremely difficult to administer. When contrasted with
Braswell and Farowitz; Robins and Cole evince a significant risk
that the application of the standard of malice or reckless indifference will lead to arbitrary or capricious results in litigation arising
under section 102.

III.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Since the language and the legislative history of section 102 are
ambiguous, 50 the determination of whether punitive damages are
an appropriate form of relief under that provision must ultimately
rest upon an analysis of the competing policy consideratiorts. 51
One of the principal purposes of the LMRDA was to deter improper union conduct. 52 Accordingly, it•has been argued that awarding
punitive damages under section 102 would serve to deter unions
from infringing upon the. Title I rights of their members. 53 This
argument is consistent with the traditional common law theory that
exemplary damages deter objectionable conduct by threatening to
make it costly. 54 _
.
As several commentators have observed, however, there is no
objective evidence indicating either that punitive damages actually

49
See, e.g., International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Braswell, 388 F.2d 193, 199 (5th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 935 (1968); Robins v. Schonfeld, 326 F. Supp. 525, 531
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); Cole v. Hall, 80 L.R.R.M. 2267, 2271 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), affd on other·
grounds, 462 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1972), affd, 412 U.S . .I (1973); Farowitz v. Associated
Musicians Local 802, 241 F. Supp. 895, 909 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
50
See notes 8-28 and accompanying text supra.
51
See Cox, supra note 11, at 852. Noting that much of the LMRDA was hastily written
and that it contains many deliberate ambiguities and political compromises, Professor Cox
counseled that "courts would be well advised to.seek out the underlying rationale without
placing great emphasis upon close construction of the words." Id.
52
Section 2(c) of the LMRDA states in part: "The Congress ... finds and declares that
the enactment of this chapter is necessary to eliminate or prevent improper practices on the
part oflaboroiganizations .... " 29 U.S.C. § 401(c) (1970). See also Sands v. Abelli, 290 F.
Supp. 677, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
53
See, e.g., Cooke v: Orange Belt Dist. Council of Painters No. 48, 529 F.2d 815,820 (9th
Cir. 1976); International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Braswell, 388 F.2d 193, 200 (5th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 391 U.S. 935 (1968); Woods v. Local 613, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 404 F.
Supp. 110, 118 (N .D. Ga. 1975); Sipe v. Local 191, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 393 F. Supp.
865, 871 (M.D. Pa. 1975); Sands v. Abelli, 290.F. Supp. 677, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
54
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 7, at§ 908(1), comment a; C. McCORMICK, supra note 7, § 77, at 275; W. PRossER, supra note 7, § 2, _at 9, 11; Morris, Punitive
Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REv. 1173, 1183 (1931); Note, The Imposition of
Punishment by Civil Courts: A Reappraisal of Punitive Damages, 41 N. Y. U.L. REv. 1158,
I 162 (1966).
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deter undesirable behavior, or that they do so more effectively than
compensatory damages. 55 This lack of evidence may imply more
about the difficulty of garnering proof than about the efficacy of
punitive damages. Nevertheless, there is reason to doubt that the
threat of exemplary damages would actually deter unions from
infringing upon the rights of their members. The application of the
gialice or reckless indifference standard has often led to decisions
under section 102 which are unpredictable, if not arbitrary or
capricious. 56 Lacking a clear understanding of the kind of behavior
which would subject them to liability for punitive damages, unions
would find it extremely difficult to conduct their affairs so as to
avoid such liability. 5 7
Moreover, the liability of unions for compensatory damages
under section 102 may already sufficiently deter conduct which
violates members' rights. 58 The possibility that a plaintiff will recover for mental suffering, even in the absence of a concomitant
physical injury, 59 makes the threat of compensatory damages a
particularly effective deterrent. Damages for emotional distress are
likely to be generously assessed by a jury sympathetic to the
plaintiff. 60
The efficacy of Title I and section 609 of the LMRDA depends
upon the willingness of union members to vindicate their rights by
bringing actions under section 102. 61 At common law, the availabil-

55
See Brandwen, supra note 26, at 465-66; Duffy, Punitive Damages: A Doctrine Which
Should Be Abolished, in THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES 4, 11 (1969); Ghiardi,
Should Punitive Damages Be Abolished?, A Statement for the Affirmative, in ABA SEC. OF
INS., NEG. & COMP. LAW 282, 288 (1965).
56
See notes 38-49 and accompanying text supra.
57
Cf. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 302 (Brennan, J., concurring), 311-12 (White, J.,
concurring), 354 n.124 (Marshall, J., concurring) (1972) (infrequency and arbitrariness of
infliction of death penalty suggests that it is not an effective deterrent).
58 Compensatory damages are recoverable under§ 102. See note 5 and accompanying text
supra. The threat of such damages may deter undesirable conduct. Brandwen, supra note
26, at 465-66; Duffy, supra note 55, at 11; Ford, The Constitutionality of Punitive Damages,
in THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES 15 (1969); Ghiardi, supra note 55, at 288.
59
·
The courts are divided over the question of whether mental suffering is compensable
under § 102 in the absence of an accompanying physical injury. Decisions holding that
mental suffering alone is compensable include: Simmons v. Avisco, Local 713, Textile
Workers, 350 F.2d 1012, 1018-19 (4th Cir. 1965); Yablonski v. United Mine Workers, 81
L.R.R.M. 2592, 2593-94 (D.D.C. 1972); Sands v. Abelli, 290 F. Supp. 677, 684 (S.D.N.Y.
1968). Decisions holding that mental suffering is not compensable in the absence of a
physical injury include: International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Rafferty, 348 F.2d 307, 315
(9th Cir. 1965); Talavera v. Teamsters Local 85, 351 F. Supp. 155, 158-59 (N.D. Cal. 1972);
Archibald v. Local 57, Int'! Union of Operating Engineers, 276 F. Supp. 326, 333 (D.R.I.
1967); Keenan v. District Council, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 266 F. Supp. 497, 500 (E.D.
Pa. 1966).
.
60
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 7, at § 908, comment c.
61
See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1973); Cox, supra note 11, at 852. The originai
Senate version of§ 102 provided exclusively for enforcement by the Secretary of Labor. In
an effort to avoid overburdening the Labor Department, however, the Senate amended this
provision to authorize suits only by union members. 105 CONG. REc. 6476, 6486, 6487, 6491
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ity of punitive damages has been defended on the ground that it
induces injured persons to sue, despite the attendant trouble and
expense. 62 Accordingly, it can be argued that exemplary damages
should be recoverable under section 102, in order to give union
members, whose rights have been infringed, an incentive to litigate
their claims.
Some such incentive may be necessary, because significant ob-.
stacles stand in the way of suits by members against their unions.
Since many union members lack extensive financial resources, the
cost of litigation may constitute a barrier to actions under section
102. 63 Additionally, where unions violate the rights of their members without inflicting any tangible damage, 64 many members may
be discouraged from bringing suit because, even if successful, they
would obtain only a negligible financial recovery. These members
might decide that it is not worth shouldering the substantial burdens of litigation merely to vindicate intangible rights. 65
Although some inducement to litigation under section 102 may
be necessary in order to overcome these obstacles, it is highly
questionable whether punitive damages are needed to serve this
purpose. In Hall v. Cole, 66 the Supreme Court held that a successful plaintiff may be awarded attorney's fees under section 102.

(1959), reprinted in II LEG. HIS. LMRDA, supra note 9, at 1102, 111.3, 1114, 1117. See also
Gartner v. Soloner, 384 F.2d 348, 349-50 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1040 (1968);
Comment, Labor Law-Mandatory Attorney's Fees-Section 102 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 51 DEN. L.J. 169, 174 (1974).
62
C. McCORMICK, supra note 7, § 77, at 276-77; W. PROSSER, supra note 7, § 2, at 11;
Coiboy, Should Punitive Damages Be Abolished? A Statement for the Negative, in ABA
SEc. oF INS., NEG. & COMP. LAW 292, 294 (1%5); Morris, supra note 54, at 1183; Note,
supra note 54, at 1162.
63 Cox, supra note II, at 853. See also Comment, Title I of the LMRDA: Rights and
Remedies of Union Members With Respect to Their Unions, 11 WILLAMETTE L.J. 258, 261
(1975). Union members may also be deterred from bringing§ 102 suits by their unfamiliarity
with the law and their hesitancy to become involved with the law, as well as by a fear of
union reprisals. Cox, supra note 11, at 853. See also Comment, at 261. Although any
retributive action by the union would likely constitute a fresh violation of the LMRDA or of
some other statute, the fear of reprisals may nevertheless exist among many union members.
64
Such circumstances are not uncommon. See Comment, supra note 61, at 175.
65 See Cox, supra note 11, at 853; Comment, supra note 63, at 261. It can be argued that
punitive damages should be recoverable under § I 02 not as a means of encouraging litigation
by union members who sustain no concrete damage from infringements upon their rights,
but as a means of affording union members full compensation for injuries which are difficult
to prove. In some jurisdictions, however, it has been held that a plaintiff may recover
damages for mental suffering under § 102, even in the absence of a concomitant physical
injury. See note 59 supra. At least in those jurisdictions, the allowance of exemplary
damages would seem entirely unnecessary to ensure the full compensation of the plaintiff. In
practice, damages for emotional distress are frequently a~sessed in an amount greater than is
required to make the plaintiff whole. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 7, at§
908, comment c. An additional award of punitive damages would constitute a pure windfall
to the plaintiff, unjustly enriching him at the defendant's expense. See Duffy, supra note 55,
at 7, 8; Ghiardi, supra note 55, at 286.
66
412 U.S. I (1973).
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Now that Hall has made fee-shifting widely available, 67 the expenses of litigation may no longer pose a. serious impediment to
suits by members against their unions. Moreover, the availability
of damages for mental suffering may provide whatever additional
incentive is required for litigation by union members who sustain
little or no tangible loss from violations of their rights. Since such
damages are often assessed generously, and in amounts larger than
are needed to reimburse plaintiffs for out-of-pocket expenses, 68
their recoverability may significantly stimulate member-union litigation. ,-\dmittedly, it has been held in some jurisdictions that
damages for emotional distress may not be awarded under section
102 in the absence of concomitant physical injury. 69 It would be
preferable to make mental suffering fully compensable, however,
rather than to permit the recovery of punitive damages. 70
Since sufficient incentives may already exist to stimulate litigation under section 102, it is likely that, if the availability of punitive
damages did indeed induce more lawsuits, such actions would
more often consist of private feuding than of the vindication of
important rights. 71 It has been argued that the value of assuring
every union member his day in court is worth the risk of insignificant litigation. 72 To invite such litigation unnecessarily, however,
would simply place an unwarranted load on the already overburdened federal courts. Furthermore, these insignificant actions
would impose a considerable burden on labor unions. 73 If the
lawsuits were merely frivolous, they would waste union resources
and hamper ordinary union activities. 74 Moreover, if the suits were
used as a weapon by one union faction against another, the federal
courts would inexorably be drawn into intra-union political battles.
Such involvement by the courts in internal union affairs is undesirable, for it ultimately tends to undermine union self-government. 75
See Comment, supra note 61; Comment, supra note 63, at 282-83.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 7, at § 908, comment c.
69 See note 59 supra.
70 The availability of damages for mental suffering, even in the absence of a physical
injury, would not only stimulate meritorious litigation under§ 102, but would also serve to
deter union conduct proscribed by Title I and § 609, and to ensure the full compensation of
union members whose rights are violated. See notes 59-60 and accompanying text supra;
note 65 supra. Moreover, this solution would avoid the serious adverse consequences of
awarding exemplary damages under § 102. For a discussion of those consequences, see
notes 71-80 and accompanying text infra.
71 Cf. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. I, 16 (1973) (White, J., dissenting) (The availability of
attorney's fees under§ 102 will incite many insignificant lawsuits.). But see Cox, supra note
II, at 852-53.
72 Cox, supra note 11, at 853.
73
Since there is a strong public interest in maintaining viable labor unions, see § I of the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C § 151 (1970); § 2(a) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. §
401(a) (1970), the imposition of this burden on unions may be contrary to the interests of the
general public.
74
See Cox, supra note 11, at 852-53.
75
See generally A. Cox, LAW AND THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 87-88 (1960); Leslie,
Federal Couns and Union Fiduciaries, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 1314 (1976).
67

68
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Even if the allowance of punitive damages under section 102 did
not provoke unwarranted litigation, it might nevertheless diminish
the strength and stability of labor organizations. The payment of
exemplary damage awards out of union treasuries, and indirectly
out of the wages of union members, would tend to undermine the
stability of unions by fomenting discord within their ranks. 76 Additionally, the satisfaction of extravagant awards of punitive damages could financially cripple some unions. Since the wealth of the
defendant is commonly considered in assessing exemplary damages, 77 the depletion of union treasuries could be minimized by the
observance of discretionary limitations on the amounts of punitive
awards. 78 .Common law decisions afford little basis for optimism,
however, that the size of exemplary awards would be effectively
limited in this way. 79
The danger that allowing exemplary damages under section 102
would undermine union strength is aggravated by the strong possibility that such damages would be awarded in inappropriate cases.
It has been extremely difficult to administer the standard that
punitive damages may be recovered only where the defendant has
acted with malice or with a reckless indifference to the plaintiff's
rights. 80 The substantial likelihood of arbitrary or capricious results is a significant disadvantage of allowing punitive damages
under section 102.
Exemplary damages at common law have sometimes been defended on the ground that they inflict a well-deserved punishment
on the defendant. 81 Whether or not punishment is in itself a legitimate end, however, it is unpersuasive to argue that exemplary
damages should be awarded under section 102 in order to punish
unions for maliciously infringing upon the rights of their members.
Since the availability of exemplary damages would have a potentially severe impact t1pon union strength and stability, it would

76
See Brandwen, supra note 26, at 477. Any suit by a member against his union, of
course, would be likely to provoke some disharmony among the membership. Such bitterness could be expected to be particularly intense, however, where the plaintiff was awarded
punitive damages. Exemplary damages essentially constitute a windfall to the. plaintiff. See
note 65 supra. Union members may be more resentful of giving a windfall to one of their
co-workers than of adequately compensating him for a tangible iajury.
77
W. PROSSER, supra note 7, § 2. at 14; see, e.g., Yablonski v. United Mine Workers, 81
L.R.R.M. 2592. 2594 (D.D.C. 1972); cf. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 7, at
§ 908(2) (The defendant's wealth is one of several factors to be considered in assessing
punitive damages.).
78
Cf. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. I, 9 n. 13 (1973) (Financial crippling of unions may be avoided
by limiting the size of awards of attorney's fees.).
79
Brandwen, supra note 26, at 466-68.
80
See notes 38-49 and accompanying text supra.
81
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 7, at§ 908(1), comment b; C. McCoRMICK, supra note 7, § 77, at 275,276; W. PROSSER, supra note 7, § 2, at 9; Corboy, supra note
62, at 293.
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seriously impair the effectiveness of unions as collective bargaining
agents. As a result, the successful plaintiff under section 102,
together with all other union members, and indeed with the public
generally, 82 would ultimately suffer.
Furthermore, it can be argued that if exemplary damages are
appropriate to punish unions, they should be awarded only within
the confines of procedural safeguards such as proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the
right to trial by jury. Indeed, punitive damages have been widely
condemned as anomalous and perhaps unconstitutional in that they
amount essentially to criminal penalties, but are imposed without
the protection afforded by the procedural safeguards which surround the criminal law. 83 A criminal defendant may be entitled to
more stringent procedural safeguards than a civil defendant exposed to liability for punitive damages, however, because of the
greater severity of the punishment to which the former is typically
subject. Even a convicted criminal who is not imprisoned is likely
to be more harshly stigmatized by society than a civil defendant
against whom punitive damages are assessed. 84
At common law, nearly every state fully recognizes the doctrine
of exemplary damages. 85 Although the House of Lords has narrowly limited the recoverability of punitive damages in England, 86
no American state has restricted the doctrine in recent years. Since

•• See note 73 supra.
83
See, e.g., Brandwen, supra note 26, at 467-68; Duffy, supra note 55, at 7; Ford, supra
note 58; Ghiardi, supra note 55, at 287-88.
84
See Note, supra note 54, at 1180-81; Comment, Criminal Safeguards and the Punitive
Damages Defendant, 34 U. Cm. L. REV. 408, 408-12 (1967).
85 Forty states which accept the doctrine of punitive damages without qualification are
listed in C. McCORMICK, supra note 7, § 78, at 278 n.2. Since this list was compiled, Alaska
and Hawaii have also fully accepted the doctrine of exemplary damages. Bridges v. Alaska
Hous. Auth., 375 P.2d 696 (Alaska 1962); Howell v. Associated Hotels, Ltd., 40 Hawaii 492
(1954).
Four states (Louisiana,, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Washington) entirely reject punitive damages. Vincent v. Morgan's La. & Tex. R.R. & S.S. Co., 140 La. 1027, 74 So. 541
(1917); Boott Mills v. Boston & Maine R.R., 218 Mass. 582, 106 N.E. 680 (1914); Riewe v.
McCormick, 11 Neb. 261, 9 N.W. 88 (1881); Wilson v. Sun Pub. Co., 85 Wash. 503, 148 P.
774 (1915).
Indiana permits exemplary damages only in cases in which the defendant's conduct is not
also punishable criminally. Taber v. Hutson, 5 Ind. 322, 61 Am. Dec. 96 (1854). Connecticut
allows punitive damages, but limits them to the amount of the plaintiff's litigation expenses.
Craney v. Donovan, 92 Conn. 236, 102 A. 640 (1917). Michigan and New Hampshire award
exemplary damages not as a punishment, but rather on the theory that they constitute extra
compensation of the plaintiff for wounded feelings or a sense of outrage. Hasted v. Van
Wagnen, 243 Mich. 350,220 N.W. 762 (1928); Wise v. Daniel, 221 Mich. 229, 190 N.W. 746
(1922); Bixby v. Dunlap, 56 N.H. 456, 22 Am. Rep. 475 (1876).
86
Rookes v. Barnard, [ 1964] A.C. 1129, 1220-33, held that punitive damages may only be
awarded in cases in which (I) they are expressly authorized by statute, (2) government
servants have acted oppressively or arbitrarily, or (3) the defendant's conduct was calculated to make a profit for himself which might well exceed the compensation payable to the
plaintiff.
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it has been subjected to severe and prevalent criticism, 87 however,
it may not be advisable to extend the doctrine of punitive damages
to a class of cases like those arising under section 102 of the
LMRDA, where its value is highly questionable.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Both the language and the legislative history of section 102 of the
LMRDA leave unsettled the question of whether a plaintiff may be
awarded punitive damages. The case law on this issue is likewise
inconclusive; the conflicting decisions of the courts cannot be
reconciled on the basis of any relevant factor. An analysis of the
decisions reveals that, in jurisdictions which sustain the availability
of exemplary damages under section 102, determining when these
damages should actually be awarded has been extremely difficult.
Frequently, the results of the cases have been unpredictable, if not
arbitrary or capricious.
The risk that such results will be reached cannot be justified by
any countervailing benefit of awarding punitive damages under
section 102. The availability of exemplary damages is unnecessary
either to deter unions from infringing upon the rights of their
members, or to induce injured members to sue to vindicate their
rights. If the lure of punitive damages did increase the volume of
litigation under section 102, moreover, many of the new lawsuits
would likely be groundless. As a result, the proper functioning of
both labor unions and the federal courts would be impaired.
Even if awards of punitive damages under section 102 did not
provoke unwarranted litigation, they would nevertheless tend to
undermine the strength and stability of unions by creating disharmony among their members, and by seriously threatening to deplete union treasuries. Ultimately, all union members, together
with the public, would suffer the consequences. Under these circumstances, it seems highly inappropriate to extend the doctrine of
punitive damages to cases arising under section 102 of the
LMRDA.
--S. Thomas Wienner

87
See, e.g., Brandwen, supra note 26; Duffy, supra note 55; Ford, supra note 58; Ghiardi,
supra note 55.

